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ABSTRACT
Ratios of public debt as a share of GDP in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico were 10 percentage points
higher on average during 1996-2002 than in the period 1990-1995. Costa Rica's debt ratio remained
stable but at a high level near 50 percent. Is there reason to be concerned for the solvency of the
public sector in these economies? We provide an answer to this question based on the quantitative
predictions of a variant of the framework proposed by Mendoza and Oviedo (2004). This
methodology yields forward-looking estimates of debt ratios consistent with fiscal solvency for a
government that faces revenue uncertainty and can issue only non-state-contingent debt. In this
environment, aversion to a collapse in outlays leads the government to respect a "natural debt limit"
equal to the annuity value of the primary balance in a "fiscal crisis." A fiscal crisis occurs after a
long sequence of adverse revenue shocks and public outlays adjust to a tolerable minimum. The debt
limit also represents a credible commitment to be able to repay even in a fiscal crisis but is not, in
general, the same as the sustainable debt, which is driven by the probabilistic dynamics of the
primary balance. The results of a baseline scenario question the sustainability of current debt ratios
in Brazil and Colombia, while those in Costa Rica and Mexico seem inside the limits consistent with
fiscal solvency. In contrast, public debt ratios are found to be unsustainable in all four countries for
plausible changes to lower average growth rates or higher real interest rates. Moreover, sustainable












1.   Introduction 
 
The ratios of public debt to GDP have been rising steadily in the economies of 
Latin America.  Comparing averages for the period 1996-2002 with those for the period 
1990-1995, the average debt ratios of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico increased by about 
10 percentage points in each country.  In Costa Rica, the public debt ratio did not change 
much, but it was already at a relatively high level of around 50 percent at the beginning 
of the 1990s.  Given that growing public debt has traditionally been an indicator of 
financial weakness and vulnerability to economic crisis in the region, there is concern for 
assessing whether these high levels of debt are in line with the solvency of the public 
sector or should be taken as a warning signal that requires policy intervention. 
  The goal of this paper is to assess the consistency of the public debt ratios of 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico with the conditions required to maintain fiscal 
solvency.  This assessment is based on a variant of the framework proposed by Mendoza 
and Oviedo (2004).  In particular, we apply their one-sector model with exogenous 
government expenditure rules.  This methodology produces estimates of the short- and 
long-run dynamics of public debt ratios in a setup in which public revenues are subject to 
random shocks and the government aims to maintain its outlays relatively smooth in the 
face of this uncertainty.   The government is handicapped in its efforts to play this 
insurer’s role because markets of contingent claims are incomplete.  The government can 
only issue one-period, non-state-contingent debt. 
  Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) show that, in this environment with incomplete 
contingent-claims markets, a government averse to a collapse in its public outlays and 
facing revenue uncertainty will impose on itself a “natural debt limit” (NDL) determined   2
by the growth-adjusted annuity value of the primary balance in a state of “fiscal crisis.”  
They define a state of fiscal crisis as the one at which a country arrives after experiencing 
a sufficiently long sequence of adverse shocks to public revenues and the government 
adjusts its outlays to minimum admissible levels. 
An important implication of the NDL is that it allows the government to offer its 
creditors a credible commitment to remain able to repay “almost surely” at all times 
(including during fiscal crises).  It is important to note that this commitment is not an ad-
hoc assumption but an implication of the assumptions that (a) government is averse to 
suffering a collapse of its outlays, (b) public revenues are stochastic, and (c) markets of 
contingent claims are incomplete.  However, the commitment is in terms of an “ability to 
pay criterion,” and as such it does not rule out default scenarios that may result from 
“willingness to pay” or strategic reasons.      
The NDL sets the upper bound for public debt but is not, in general, the same as 
the “sustainable” or equilibrium level of debt.  The model does not require public debt to 
remain constant at the level of the NDL.  Instead, the path of “sustainable” or equilibrium 
public debt depends on the initial conditions of debt and revenue, the probabilistic 
process driving revenues, and the policy rules governing public outlays.  In the short-run, 
the dynamics of the distribution of public debt are driven by the government budget 
constraint.  In the long run, depending on alternative sequences of realizations of public 
revenues, the government can end up retiring all the debt or hitting the debt limit.  This 
extreme behavior of the long-run debt dynamics is particular to this basic version of the 
Mendoza-Oviedo model.  The two-sector general equilibrium variant of their framework   3
with endogenous government outlays features a unique, invariant long-run distribution of 
public debt (see Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) for details). 
 The results suggest that current debt ratios in Brazil and Colombia are near the 
natural debt limits that would be consistent with fiscal solvency only if one assumes 
perceived commitments to large reductions in non-interest outlays (in excess of 6 
percentage points of GDP) in a fiscal crisis. Mexico was also near its debt limit in 1998.  
However, in Mexico’s case the reduction in outlays that would have been needed to keep 
the government solvent if revenues had continued to suffer adverse shocks was smaller 
(at 1.5 percentage points of GDP).  Still, in all three cases the implied level of adjustment 
in outlays to keep the government solvent in a state of fiscal crisis is more than two 
standard deviations below recent averages, indicating that the likelihood that the 
countries could produce the required adjustment in outlays if they were called to act on 
their perceived commitment is low.  In contrast, the model indicates that Costa Rica’s 
largest public debt ratio of the last 12 years could be financed in a state of fiscal crisis 
with a modest cut in outlays equivalent to 1.2 times the standard deviation of outlays. 
The above results are very sensitive to underlying assumptions regarding the 
long-run real interest rate and growth rate.  Current debt ratios in all four countries are 
found to be unsustainable for plausible reductions in growth rates to the averages of the 
last 20 years, instead of the average of the last 40 years used in the baseline scenario.  
Similarly, the current debt ratios are found to be unsustainable if the long-run real interest 
rate is set at 8 percent instead of the 5 percent value of the baseline estimates. 
The Mendoza-Oviedo framework was designed as a forward-looking policy tool 
that intentionally sets aside the risk of default.  This was done because the framework is   4
intended to produce the sustainable debt ratios that a government that does not consider 
the option of defaulting on its obligations could support.  This is in line with the 
assumptions of the traditional approaches to assess debt sustainability based on 
deterministic steady-state estimates or empirical applications of the intertemporal 
government budget constraint.  However, while this approach is the ideal benchmark in a 
forward-looking policy analysis, it does have the drawback that it does not take into 
account how default risk considerations could affect sustainable debt dynamics.  To 
address this issue, we study in this paper how estimates of natural debt limits and 
simulated debt dynamics vary when the basic Mendoza-Oviedo model is modified to 
incorporate exogenous default risk.  Introducing default risk results in marked reductions 
in the levels of natural debt limits. 
We also compare the results of the Mendoza-Oviedo model with those produced 
by the conventional methodology based on calculations of steady-state debt ratios (or 
“Blanchard ratios”).  In the countries where the average of revenues exceeds that of 
outlays by a large enough margin (Costa Rica and Mexico), the Blanchard ratio yields 
higher debt ratios than the natural debt limits of the Mendoza-Oviedo model.  This 
finding shows that assessments of sustainable debt based on steady-state calculations that 
use averages of revenues and outlays and fail to take into account aggregate, non-
insurable fiscal shocks can lead countries to borrow more than what is consistent with 
fiscal solvency.  In the countries where the averages of revenues and outlays are very 
similar (Brazil and Colombia), the Blanchard ratios yield negligible debt ratios.  The 
Mendoza-Oviedo model can explain high levels of debt in these cases if the government 
can commit (credibly) to large enough cuts in outlays in a state of fiscal crisis.  To be   5
credible, however, these cuts must not represent unusually large deviations relative to the 
historical mean (i.e., they should not be larger than two standard deviations in percent of 
the mean).  
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 is a short survey of the existing 
methods for calculating public debt ratios consistent with fiscal solvency.  Section 3 
summarizes the one-good variant of the Mendoza-Oviedo model.  Section 4 applies the 
model to the cases of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico and discusses the results.  
This Section includes sensitivity analysis and an extension to incorporate exogenous 
default risk.  Section 5 reflects on important caveats of the analysis and provides general 
conclusions. 
2.   Computing Public Debt Ratios Consistent with Fiscal Solvency: A Survey 
A central question in fiscal policy discussions is how to determine whether the 
stock of public debt is “sustainable,” in the sense of being consistent with the fiscal 
solvency conditions implied by current and future patterns of government revenue and 
outlays.  Developing effective tools for computing these sustainable public debt ratios has 
proven a difficult task.    
The first problem that studies in this area face is how to give operational content 
to the notion of fiscal sustainability.  There is a tendency to associate the notion of 
unsustainable public debt with failure to satisfy the government budget constraint, or with 
the government holding a negative net-worth position.  However, from an analytical 
standpoint these can be misleading because the “true” government budget constraint (as 
an accounting identity relating the overall public sector borrowing requirement to all 
sources and uses of government revenue) must always hold.  Thus, an analysis that shows   6
that a given stock of public debt fails a “particular” definition of the budget constraint is 
ultimately reflecting the fact that the analysis failed to incorporate important features of 
the actual fiscal situation of the country under study.  How this failure translates into a 
judgment about the sustainability of public debt depends on assessments (typically 
implicit in the analysis) about the macroeconomic outcomes associated with the different 
mechanisms that can be used to maintain fiscal balance.  Arguments about sustainability 
are therefore implicitly arguments about the pros and cons of these alternative 
mechanisms, not about whether the intertemporal budget constraint of the government 
holds.  
Consider a basic example.  In the canonical long-run analysis of public debt 
sustainability, we consider long-run, average levels of public revenue and expenditures, 
and view as the sustainable debt-output ratio the annuity value of a long-run target of the 
primary balance-output ratio.  If a government has a large stock of contingent liabilities 
because of the high risk of a banking crisis, the stock of public debt may be judged to be 
unsustainable because, once these contingent liabilities are added, the debt-output ratio 
exceeds the long-run indicator of sustainability.   However, the government budget 
constraint must hold, and thus if a banking crisis does occur the government will 
ultimately have to adjust the primary balance or rely on other “sources” of financing such 
as the inflation tax or a debt default.  Adjustment via the primary balance is generally 
judged as consistent with this canonical view of sustainability, while adjustment via 
inflation or default would not because these would be viewed as alternatives inferior to 
adjustment of the primary balance in terms of social welfare.   7
Beyond the problem of defining an operational concept of public debt 
sustainability, there are also problems in the design of methods for calculating sustainable 
debt levels.  These difficulties reflect the gap between the aspects of fiscal policy 
emphasized in the different methods and those aspects that seem empirically relevant for 
explaining the actual fiscal position of governments.  The literature on methods for 
assessing public debt sustainability reflects the evolution of ideas on these issues.  In the 
lines below we review the main features of the different methods.  The intent is not to 
conduct a comprehensive survey of the literature (as there are already a number of 
excellent surveys, see for example Chalk and Hemming (2000) or IMF (2002) and 
(2003a)) but to highlight the central differences among the existing methods. 
The starting point of most of the existing methods for calculating sustainable 
public debt-output ratios is the period budget constraint of the government.  This 
constraint is merely an accounting identity that relates all the flows of government 
receipts and payments to the change in public debt: 
  1 (1 ) ( ) tt tt t B BrT G + =+ −− (1) 
 
where Bt+1 is the stock of public debt issued by the end of period t, Bt is maturing public 
debt on which the government pays principal and the real interest rate rt, Tt is total real 
government revenue and Gt are current real government outlays (i.e., Tt - Gt is the 
primary fiscal balance). 
Long-Run Methods 
As the example of the long-run approach to debt sustainability given earlier 
illustrated, the long-run approach is based on steady-state, perfect-foresight 
considerations that transform the government’s accounting identity (1) into an equation   8
that maps the long-run primary fiscal balance as a share of output into a “sustainable” 
debt-to-output ratio that remains constant over time (see Buiter (1985), Blanchard (1990) 
and Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990)).  In particular, if we define the 
long-run rate of output growth as γ  and after some basic algebraic manipulation, the 










where b is the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio, t and g are the long-run GDP shares of current 
revenue and outlays, and r is the steady-state real interest rate.   Condition (2) can be read 
as an indicator of fiscal policy action (i.e., of the “permanent” primary balance-output 
ratio that needs to be achieved by means of revenue or expenditure policies so as to 
stabilize a given debt-output ratio), or as an indicator of a “sustainable” debt ratio (i.e., 
the target debt-output ratio implied by a given projection of the long-run primary 
balance-output ratio).   
Intertemporal Methods 
An important shortcoming of the long-run approach is that it fails to recognize 
that the “long run” is essentially a theoretical construct.  In the short run governments 
face a budget constraint that does not reduce to the simplistic (albeit significantly more 
tractable) formula of the long-run analysis.  There can be temporarily high debt ratios, or 
temporarily large primary deficits, that are consistent with government solvency, and 
indeed incurring in such temporarily high debt or deficits could be optimal from a tax-
smoothing perspective.  To force a country into the straight jacket of keeping its public 
debt-output ratio no larger than the level that corresponds to the long-run stationary state   9
can therefore be a serious mistake.   The realization of these flaws in the long-run 
calculations led to the development of intertemporal-budget-constraint methods that 
shifted the focus from analyzing directly the debt-output ratio to studying the time-series 
properties of the fiscal balance, so as to test whether these properties are consistent with 
the conditions required to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  This 
intertemporal constraint serves as a means to link the short-run dynamics of debt and the 
primary balance with the long-run solvency constraint of the government. 
In their original form (see Hamilton and Flavin (1986)) the intertemporal methods 
aimed to test whether the data can reject the hypothesis that the condition ruling out 
Ponzi games on public debt holds.  This condition states that at any date t the discounted 
value of the stock of public debt t+j periods into the future should vanish as j goes to 
infinity:  .  In other words, in the long run the stock of debt 
cannot grow faster than the gross interest rate.  If this no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition 
holds, the forward solution of (1) implies that the intertemporal government budget 
constraint holds: The present value of the primary fiscal balance is equal to the value of 
the existing stock of debt, and hence the exiting public debt or public debt-output ratio is 













A number of articles tried different variations of this test by testing for stationarity 
and co-integration in the time series of the primary balance and public debt, and produced 
different results using U.S. data (Chalk and Hemming (2000) review this literature).   
These intertemporal-budget-constraint methods also began to introduce elements of 
uncertainty into public debt sustainability analysis, but mostly in an indirect manner as 
sources of statistical error in hypothesis testing, or by testing the NPG condition in   10
expected value or as an orthogonality condition that considers the fact that at equilibrium 
the sequence of real interest rates used to discount the “terminal” debt stock must match 
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in private consumption.
1 
The article by Bohn (1998) provided an alternative interpretation of intertemporal 
methods that reduces them to testing if the primary balance responds positively to 
increases in public debt.  In particular, if the primary balance-output ratio and the debt-
output ratio are stationary, the following regression can be used to test for sustainability: 
  tt t sb Z t ρ α =+ ⋅ + ε
                                                
 (3) 
 
where st is the ratio of the primary fiscal balance over GDP, ε t is a well-behaved error 
term and Zt is a vector of determinants of the primary balance other than the initial stock 
of public debt.  In Bohn’s case, he included in Zt the cyclical variations in U.S. GDP and 
a measure of “abnormal” government expenditures associated with war episodes.  He 
found strong evidence in favor of ρ  > 0.  Thus, controlling for war-time spending and the 
business cycle, the debt-output ratio is mean-reverting in U.S. data.  Moreover, the 
positive coefficient ρ , indicating that the primary balance displays a linear response that 
is both positive and systematic to increases in debt, is sufficient (albeit not necessary) to 
ensure that the intertemporal government budget constraint holds.  This is because, as the 
more recent methods for evaluating fiscal sustainability under uncertainty emphasize, 
ensuring fiscal sustainability requires that above a certain critical maximum level of debt 
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b*, the primary balance responds positively (in either linear or non-linear fashion) to 
changes in public debt.  The intuition is that if this is the case any large increase in debt 
due to “ large negative shocks” is eventually reversed through primary surpluses.  
Chapter III of IMF (2003b) applied Bohn’s method to a panel of industrial and 
developing country data.  The results identified a group of developing countries where 
the sustainability condition ρ  > 0 holds, and others where it does not.  Moreover, the 
study also shows evidence of non-linearities in the relationship between debt and primary 
balances, indicating that countries that were able to sustain larger debt ratios in the data 
also displayed a stronger response of the primary balance to debt increases.  
Recent Development: Probabilistic Methods and Methods with Financial Frictions 
Recent developments in public debt sustainability analysis follow two strands.  
The first strand emphasizes the fact that governments, particularly in emerging markets, 
face significant sources of uncertainty as they try to assess the patterns of government 
revenue and expenditures, and hence the level of debt that they can afford to maintain.  
From the perspective of these probabilistic methods, measures of sustainability derived 
from the long-run approach or the intertemporal analysis are seen as inaccurate for 
governments that hold large stocks of debt and face large shocks to their revenues and 
expenditures.  The key question here is not whether public debt is sustainable at some 
abstract steady state, or whether in a sample of a country’s recent or historical past the 
NPG condition holds.  The key question is whether the current debt-output ratio is 
sustainable given the current domestic and international economic environment and its 
future prospects.     12
The second strand aims to incorporate elements of the financial frictions literature 
applied to the recent emerging-markets crises.  For example, public debt in many 
emerging markets displays a characteristic referred to as “liability dollarization” (i.e., 
debt is often denominated in foreign currency or indexed to the price level.).  As a result, 
abrupt changes in domestic relative prices that are common in the aftermath of a large 
devaluation, or a ‘sudden stop’ to net capital inflows, can alter dramatically standard 
long-run calculations of sustainable debt ratios and render levels of debt that looked 
sustainable in one situation unsustainable in another.  Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) 
evaluate these effects for the Argentine case and find that large changes in the relative 
price of nontradables alter significantly the assessments obtained with standard steady-
state sustainability analysis.  The general version of the Mendoza-Oviedo model also 
incorporates these effects (see Mendoza and Oviedo (2004)). 
The probabilistic methods for assessing fiscal sustainability propose alternative 
strategies for dealing with macroeconomic uncertainty.  A method proposed at the IMF 
by Barnhill and Kopits (2003) incorporates uncertainty by adapting the value-at-risk 
(VaR) principles of the finance industry to debt instruments issued by governments. The 
aim of this approach is to model the probability of a negative net worth position for the 
government. The method requires estimates of the present values of the main elements of 
the balance sheet of the total consolidated public sector (financial assets and liabilities, 
expected revenues from sales of commodities or other goods and services, as well as any 
contingent assets and liabilities), and an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
variables that are viewed as determinants of those present values in reduced form. This 
information is then used to compute measures of dispersion relative to the present values   13
of the different assets and liabilities that determine the value at risk (or exposure to 
negative net worth) of the government. 
A second probabilistic method recently considered for country surveillance at the 
IMF (see IMF (2003c)) modifies the long-run method to incorporate variations to the 
determinants of sustainable public debt in the right-hand-side of equation (2), and also 
examines short-term debt dynamics that result from different assumptions about the 
short-run path of the variables that enter the government budget constraint in 
deterministic form.  For example, deterministic debt dynamics up to 10 periods into the 
future are computed for variations of the growth rate of output of two standard deviations 
relative to its mean.   
The same IMF publication proposes a stochastic simulation approach that 
computes the probability density function of possible debt-output ratios. This stochastic 
simulation model, like the VaR approach, is based on a non-structural time-series 
analysis of the macroeconomic variables that drive the dynamics of public debt 
(particularly output growth, interest rates, and the primary balance). The difference is that 
the stochastic simulation model produces simulated probability distributions based on 
forward simulations of a vector-autoregression model that combines the determinants of 
debt dynamics as endogenous variables with a vector of exogenous variables. The 
distributions are then used to make assessments of sustainable debt in terms of the 
probability that the simulated debt ratios are greater or equal than a critical value. 
Xu and Ghezzi (2002) developed a third probabilistic method to evaluate 
sustainable public debt. Their method computes "fair spreads" on public debt that reflect 
the default probabilities implied by a continuous-time stochastic model of the dynamics   14
of treasury reserves in which exchange rates, interest rates, and the primary fiscal balance 
follow Brownian motion processes (so that they capture drift and volatility observed in 
the data).  The analysis is similar to that of the first-generation models of balance-of-
payments crises.  Default occurs when treasury reserves are depleted, and thus debt is 
deemed unsustainable when the properties of the underlying Brownian motions are such 
that the expected value of treasury reserves declines to zero (which occurs at an 
exponential rate). 
3.    The  Basic Version of the Mendoza-Oviedo Model 
The probabilistic methods summarized in the last section make significant 
progress in incorporating macroeconomic uncertainty into debt sustainability analysis but 
they are largely based on non-structural econometric methods.  In contrast, the Mendoza -
Oviedo (MO) method aims to provide an explicit dynamic equilibrium model of the 
mechanism by which macroeconomic shocks affect government finances.  The MO 
method also differs from the other probabilistic methods in that it models explicitly the 
nature of the government’s forward-looking commitment to remain solvent, instead of 
focusing on computing estimates of exposure to negative net worth or depletion of 
treasury reserves.  As explained below, the MO method determines sustainable debt 
ratios that respect a natural debt limit consistent with a credible commitment to repay 
similar in principle to the one implicit in the long-run and intertemporal methods. 
The structural emphasis of the MO approach comes at the cost of the reduced 
flexibility and increased complexity of the numerical solution methods required to solve 
non-linear, dynamic stochastic equilibrium models with incomplete asset markets.  At the 
same time, by proceeding in this manner the MO framework seeks to produce estimates   15
of sustainable public debt that are robust to the Lucas critique.  The non-structural or 
reduced-form tools used in the other probabilistic methods to model the dynamics of 
public debt are vulnerable to the policy instability problems resulting from the Lucas 
critique. This is not a serious limitation when these methods are used for an ex-post 
evaluation of how well past debt dynamics matched fiscal solvency conditions, but it can 
be a shortcoming for a forward-looking analysis that requires a framework for describing 
how equilibrium prices and allocations, and hence the ability of the government to raise 
revenue and service debt, adjust to alternative tax and expenditure policies or other 
changes in the environment (including, for example, a Sudden Stop limiting the access to 
international capital markets or a collapse in the real exchange rate triggered by a 
devaluation of the currency). 
The basic principles of the MO method are as follows.  Assume that output 
follows a deterministic trend (so that it grows at a constant, exogenous rate γ ) and the real 
interest rate is constant.  Public revenues follow an exogenous stochastic process.  The 
government is extremely averse to suffering a collapse in its outlays.  Hence, it aims to 
keep its outlays smooth unless the loss of access to debt markets forces it to adjust them 
to minimum tolerable levels.  The government can only issue non-state-contingent debt.  
The government budget constraint in (1) can then be re-written as:  
  1 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) tt t bbrt g t γ + += + − −  (4) 
 
where lowercase letters refer to ratios relative to GDP.   
Since the government wants to rule out a collapse of its outlays below their 
tolerable minimum levels, it would not want to borrow more than the amount of debt it 
could service if the primary balance were to remain forever (or “almost surely” in the   16
language of probability theory) at its lowest possible value, or “fiscal crisis” state. A state 
of fiscal crisis is defined as a situation reached after a “sufficiently” long sequence of the 
worst realization of public revenues and after public outlays have been adjusted to their 
tolerable minimum.  This upper bound on debt is labeled the “Natural Debt Limit” 
(NDL), which is the term used in the precautionary-savings literature for an analogous 
debt limit that private agents impose on themselves when they can only using non-state-
contingent assets to try to smooth consumption (see Aiyagari (1994)).  The NDL is given 
by the growth-adjusted annuity value of the primary balance in the state of fiscal crisis. 
The “history of events” leading to a fiscal crisis has non-zero probability 
(although it could be a very low probability) as long as that crisis state is an event within 
the support of the probability distribution of the primary balance, and as long as there are 
non-zero conditional probabilities of moving into this crisis state from other realizations 
of the primary balance.  Under these conditions, the government knows that there is some 
probability that it could suffer a fiscal crisis in the future, and to ensure it can pay for its 
minimum level of outlays it must not hold more debt than it could service then. 
Since the NDL is a time-invariant debt level that satisfies the government budget 
constraint with revenues and outlays set at their minimum, it follows that the NDL 
implies that the government remains able to service its debt even in a state of fiscal crisis.  
Thus, the NDL that a government imposes on itself in order to self-insure so as to rule out 
a collapse of public outlays below its tolerable minimum also allows that government to 
offer lenders a credibly commitment to remain able to repay its debt in all states of 
nature.    17
  To turn the above notions of the NDL and its implied credible commitment to 
repay into operational concepts, we need to be specific about the factors that determine 
the probabilistic dynamics of the components of the primary balance.  On the revenue 
side, the probabilistic processes driving tax revenues reflect the uncertainty affecting tax 
rates and tax bases.  These processes have one component that is the result of domestic 
policy variability and the endogenous response of the economy to this variability, and 
another component that is largely exogenous to the domestic economy (which typically 
results from the nontrivial effects of factors like fluctuations in commodity prices and 
commodity exports on government revenues).  The one-sector version of the MO model 
used in this paper incorporates explicitly the second component.
2 
On the expenditure side, government expenditures adjust largely in response to 
policy decisions, but the manner in which they respond varies widely across countries.  
Industrial countries tend to display countercyclical fiscal policies while fiscal policy in 
emerging markets is generally procyclical (as the recent literature on procyclical fiscal 
policy has shown).  In addition, the “adjustment” or minimum level of public outlays to 
which the government can commit to adjust in a fiscal crisis is particularly important for 
determining the NDL and the sustainable debt ratios in the MO model. 
Labeling the fiscal-crisis level (or lowest realization) of the government revenue-
GDP ratio as t
min and the minimum level of the ratio of outlays to GDP that the 
government can commit to deliver as g
min (for g
min < t
min), it follows from the government 
budget constraint in (4) that the NDL is the value of b* given by: 
                                                 
2 Note that the exogenous determinants of public revenue dynamics can be important even in economies 
that have successfully diversified their exports away from primary commodities.  In Mexico, for example, 
oil exports are less than 15 percent of total exports but oil-related revenues still represent more than 1/3 of 














This NDL is lower for governments that have (a) higher variability in public revenues 
(for example, if fiscal revenue follows a symmetric Markov chain that obeys the rule of 
simple persistence, the value of t
min can be written as a multiple of the standard deviation 
of public revenues and hence lower values of t
min reduce the debt limit), (b) less 
flexibility to adjust public outlays, and (c) lower growth rates or higher real interest rates. 
The NDL represents a credible commitment to repay in the sense that it ensures 
that the government remains able to repay even in a state of fiscal crisis for a given 
known stochastic process driving revenues and a given policy setting the minimum level 
of outlays.  However, this should not be interpreted as suggesting that the need to respect 
the NDL rules out the possibility of sovereign default.  Default triggered by “inability to 
pay” remains possible if there are large, unexpected shocks that drive revenues below 
what was perceived to be the value of t
min or if the government turns out to be unable to 
reduce outlays to g
min when a fiscal crisis hits.  In addition, default triggered by 
“unwillingness to pay” remains possible since the NDL is only an ability to pay criterion 
that cannot rule out default for strategic reasons.  Later in Section 4 we explore an 
extension of this framework that incorporates default risk into the basic MO setup. 
Consider a government with exogenous, random fiscal revenues (say, for 
example, oil export revenues) and an ad-hoc smoothing policy rule for government 
expenditures, such that gt = g (for g≥  g
min) as long as bt+1 ≥  b*, otherwise gt adjusts to 
satisfy condition (4).  By (4) and (5), if at a particular date the current debt ratio is below 
b* and the realization of the revenue-output ratio is t
min, the government finances g by   19
increasing bt+1.  In contrast, if at some date the current debt ratio is at b* and the 
realization of revenues is t
min, (4) and (5) imply that gt=g
min. 
In a simple example with zero initial debt, it is straightforward to show that if the 
government keeps drawing the minimum realization of public revenue, it will take the T 
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This result indicates that, in the worst-case scenario in which revenues remain "almost 
surely" at their minimum, the government can access the debt market to keep the ratio of 
public outlays at the level g for a longer period of time the larger is the excess of 
"normal" government outlays over minimum government outlays relative to the excess of 
normal outlays over the minimum level of revenues.  Thus, the government uses debt to 
keep its outlays as smooth as possible given its capacity to service debt as determined by 
the volatility of its public revenues, reflected in the value of t
min , and its ability to reduce 
public outlays in a fiscal crisis, reflected in the value of g
min .  
  It is critical to note that the key element of the expenditure policy is not the level 
of g
min per se but the credibility of the announcement that outlays would be so reduced 
during a fiscal crunch.  The ability to sustain debt and the credibility of this 
announcement depend on each other because a government with a credible ex ante 
commitment to major expenditure cuts during a fiscal crisis can borrow more and access 
the debt market for longer time, and hence, everything else the same, this government 
faces a lower probability to be called to act on its commitment.  In a more general case in 
which public revenue is not an exogenous probabilistic process but it is in part the result   20
of tax policies and their interaction with endogenous tax bases, the credibility argument 
extends to tax policy.  Governments that can credibly commit to generate higher and less 
volatile tax revenue-output ratios will be able to sustain higher levels of debt, and to the 
extent that this helps the economy produce stable tax bases it helps support the credibility 
of the government’s ability to raise revenue.  
  The condition defining the NDL in (5) has a similar form as the formula for 







.  However, the 
implications for assessing fiscal sustainability under the two methods are sharply 
different.  In general, the long-run deterministic rule will always identify as sustainable a 
debt-output ratio that is unsustainable once uncertainty of the determinants of the fiscal 
balance and the NDL are taken into account.  This is because the long-run method 
ignores the role of the volatility of the elements of the fiscal balance, while in the MO 
model one finds that, everything else the same, governments with less variability in tax 
revenues can sustain higher debt ratios.    
Consider the case of two governments with identical long-run averages of tax 
revenue-output ratios at 20 percent.  The tax revenue-output ratio of government A has a 
standard deviation of 1 percent relative to the mean, while that of Government B has a 
standard deviation of 5 percent relative to the mean.   Assuming for simplicity that the 
distributions of tax revenue-output ratios are Markov processes with t
min set at two 
standard deviations below the mean, the probabilistic model would compute the natural 
debt limit for A using a value of t
min of 18 percent, while for B it would use 10 percent.  
The deterministic long-run method yields the same debt ratio for both governments and 
uses the common 20 percent average tax revenue-output ratio to compute it.  In contrast,   21
the MO method would find that debt ratio unsustainable for both governments and would 
produce a debt limit for B that is lower than that for A. 
   Another important difference between the two methods is in the way that the MO 
method views the debt limit vis-à-vis the way in which the long-run method views the 
steady-state debt ratio.  In the long-run analysis, the debt ratio is viewed as either a target 
ratio to which a government should be forced to move to, or as the anchor for a target 
primary balance-GDP ratio that should be achieved by means of a policy correction.  In 
contrast, in the MO method condition (5) defines only the maximum level of debt.  
Unless the NDL binds, this maximum level of debt is not the equilibrium or sustainable 
level of debt that should be issued by the government (although it clearly plays a central 
role in determining both).  Depending on the probabilistic and policy assumptions driving 
revenues and expenditures (and, generalizing condition (5), depending also on the 
stochastic processes of the real interest rate and output growth), a country can have levels 
of debt lower (even much lower) than this critical level, and may take a very long time on 
average to enter a state of fiscal crisis or even never arrive at it. 
The MO methodology models uncertainty in the form of discrete Markov 
processes.   Given information on the current stock of public debt, the current tax 
revenue-GDP ratio and the assumed behavioral rules for government outlays and 
statistical moments of the public revenue process, the model produces conditional one-
period-ahead and unconditional long-run distributions of the debt-output ratio, as well as 
estimates of the average number of periods in which b* is expected to be reached from 
any initial bt.  Again, depending on the nature of the stochastic processes and policy rules   22
of revenues and outlays, it may take a few quarters to hit the debt ceiling on average or it 
may take an infinite number of quarters to do it 
4.   Results of the MO Method for Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica & Mexico 
  This Section applies the MO method described in the last section to the cases of 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.  The Section begins with a brief review of the 
recent growth performance and evolution of public debt, public revenues and public 
expenditure ratios in these countries.  This review serves to identify key parameters 
needed to simulate the debt dynamics and solve for natural debt limits. 
Review of Growth Performance and Fiscal Dynamics 
  The growth performance of the four countries examined in this study over the last 
two decades was weak.  As shown in Table 1, average growth in GDP per capita for the 
period 1981-2000 ranged from a minimum of 0.5 percent in Brazil to a maximum of 1.25 
percent in Costa Rica.  These countries grew at faster rates in the past.  Taking averages 
starting in 1961, the smallest average per-capita GDP growth rate was 1.8 percent for 
Costa Rica and the largest was 2.6 percent for Brazil.  Given the apparent structural 
breaks in the trend of GDP per capita of these countries since the early 1980s, we conduct 
our public debt analysis under a baseline growth scenario that uses 1961-2000 average 
growth rates, and compare the results with a scenario that views the growth slowdown of 
the last two decades as permanent by using 1981-2000 average growth rates. 
  Reliable cross-country estimates of public debt stocks and interest rates on public 
debt at the general government level are hard to obtain.   We use the figures documented 
in IMF (2003b) for ratios of public debt to GDP for the period 1990-2002.  As shown in 
Table 1, the mean debt-GDP ratios for the full sample range from 33.7 percent in   23
Colombia to 49.5 percent in Costa Rica.  However, these full-sample averages hide the 
fact shown in Figure 1 that debt ratios have been growing rapidly (except in the case of 
Costa Rica, where the ratio has been fairly stable but also fairly high).  If we split the 
sample to create averages for 1990-1995 and 1996-2002, we find that the mean debt 
ratios of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico increased by about 10 percentage points between 
the first period and the second periods.  By the end of the sample period, all four 
countries displayed debt ratios of about 50 percent (see Figure 1).  The key question to 
answer is therefore whether a debt ratio of 50 percent is consistent with fiscal solvency 
given the pattern of growth and interest rates and the volatility of fiscal revenues that 
these countries face. 
  Real interest rates on public debt are hard to measure because of differences in 
maturity, currency denomination, indexation factors, and residence of creditors for the 
various debt instruments that each country issues, and also because of the existence of 
time-varying default and exchange-rate risk premia.  One useful proxy is the measure of 
sovereign risk proposed by Neumeyer and Perri (2003), which is the spread of the 
EMBI+ index relative to the U.S. T-Bill rate deflated by an estimate of expected inflation 
in the U.S. GDP deflator.   The sample period of this measure is relatively short (starting 
in 1994) and biased because it includes mainly observations for a turbulent period in 
world capital markets.  Still, this measure of real interest rates on public debt shows 
substantial premia over the world’s risk free rate (the average real interest rates including 
the risk premia for a quarterly sample from 1994:1 to 2002:2, are 12.9 percent for Brazil 
and 10.3 percent for Mexico).  The real interest rate on debt instruments will deviate from 
these figures to the extent that (a) debt instruments are domestic rather than external, (b)   24
debt is denominated in domestic currency rather than in foreign currency or in terms of 
an indexation factor, and (c) the debt instruments have liquidity or transactions value for 
the holders.  The lower bound of the interest rate on public debt is set by the real interest 
rate on U.S. public debt.  The 1981:1-2000:4 average of the U.S. 90 day T-bill rate 
deflated by observed U.S. CPI inflation is about 2.8 percent.   
Given the above considerations, we consider two interest rate scenarios in our 
calculations.  The baseline scenario considers a real interest rate of 5 percent, which 
incorporates a small long-run default risk premium of about 2.2 percentage points above 
the U.S. T-bill rate.  The alternative is a high-real-interest-rate scenario in which the real 
interest rate is set at 8 percent (i.e., the long-run default risk premium is about 5.3 
percentage points above the T-bill rate).  In both scenarios we remain relatively 
optimistic about growth prospects, using average growth rates for the period 1961-2000. 
  The measure of public revenues that we need to isolate for conducting the debt 
analysis is the total of all tax and non-tax government revenues excluding grants.  For 
government expenditures we require the total non-interest government outlays (including 
all expenditures and transfer payments and excluding all forms of debt service).  Once 
again, limitations of the existing international databases make it difficult to retrieve 
consistent measures of these variables that apply at the level of the entire non-financial 
public sector and, in the case of the outlays, that include the annuity values of all 
contingent liabilities resulting from obligations like banking- or pension-system bailouts.  
We put together estimates of the revenue and outlay ratios for the four countries under 
study by combining data from IMF (2003b) and World Development Indicators (see the 
footnotes to Table 1 for details).  The former shows data for the non-financial public   25
sector but it does not separate interest and non-interest expenditures for some countries. 
The latter separates interest and non-interest expenditures but reports data only for the 
central government.  Thus, the revenue and expenditures data are not exactly comparable 
across countries.   
  The average ratios of total public revenue to GDP during the period 1990-2002 
ranged from 12.6 percent in Colombia to 23 percent in Mexico (Table 1).  Turning to 
examine the volatility of public revenues, Costa Rica displays the lowest coefficient of 
variation in the revenue-output ratio, at 5.4 percent of the mean.  The coefficient of 
variation of revenues is similar in Colombia and Mexico (8.9 and 8 percent respectively).  
Brazil shows the highest coefficient of variation of public revenues at 14.1 percent.  
Interestingly, the country with the lowest coefficient of variation in public revenues 
(Costa Rica) is also the one with the highest average public debt-GDP ratio. 
  The average of total non-interest outlays as a share of GDP is very similar in 
Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico, at about 19 percent.  The average outlays ratio for 
Colombia is much lower, at 12.8 percent, but this is one of the measures that applies only 
to the central government, so the actual ratio for the non-financial-public sector must be 
higher.  With regard to the variability of non-interest outlays, Mexico shows the smallest 
coefficient of variation (about 4 percent), followed by Costa Rica (10 percent).  Brazil 
and Colombia show the highest coefficients of variation in the outlays ratio, at about 14 
percent for both. 
Natural Debt Limits: Baseline Scenario and Two Alternatives 
  Table 1 reports three sets of calculations of natural debt limits for Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.  The baseline scenario considers the 1961-2000   26
average growth rates of GDP per capita and a 5 percent real interest rate.  The growth- 
slowdown (GS) scenario uses the 1981-2000 average growth rates (with the real interest 
rate still at 5 percent).  The high-real-interest-rate (HRIR) scenario uses a real interest 
rate of 8 percent (with the growth rates set at the 1961-2000 averages). 
  The baseline scenario differs from the other two because it is designed to produce 
a coefficient of fiscal adjustment that yields an NDL equal to the largest debt ratio 
observed for each country in the 1990-2002 period.  Table 1 reports this coefficient of 
“implied fiscal adjustment” in terms of how many standard deviations relative to the 
mean of non-interest outlays are needed to yield a debt limit equal to maximum observed 
debt (given the data for means and coefficients of variation of revenues and outlays, the 
average growth rates, the real interest rate, and assumed floors of public revenue equal to 
two standard deviations below the corresponding means).  The Table also shows the 
implied minimum ratio of outlays to GDP resulting from the coefficient of fiscal 
adjustment.  The GS and HRIR scenario keep the same fiscal adjustment coefficient and 
just alter either the growth rate or the real interest rate. 
  The public debt-GDP ratios of the four countries under study peaked at similar 
levels during the 1990-2002 period (ranging from 50 percent in Colombia to 56 percent 
in Brazil).   The coefficients of implied fiscal adjustment reported in Table 1 show that, in 
order to produce NDLs that can support these high levels of debt, three of the four 
countries (Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) need credible commitments to undertake large 
cuts in outlays if they were to hit a fiscal crisis.  The adjustment measures 2 standard 
deviations below the mean of non-interest government outlays in Mexico, 2.3 in 
Colombia and 2.6 in Brazil (which are equivalent to cuts relative to the average outlays-  27
GDP ratios of 1.5, 4 and 6.7 percentage points respectively).  The fact that these 
adjustments are outside the two-standard-deviation threshold of the data for non-interest 
outlays of the previous decade suggests that the probability that the governments could 
produce these large expenditure cuts if they needed to act on their commitment is low.  
The situation in Costa Rica seems more favorable.  Costa Rica can support a 
credible commitment to repay a debt-output ratio as large as 53 percent of GDP with a 
fiscal adjustment of 1.2 standard deviations below the mean of non-interest outlays 
(which is equivalent to about 2 percentage points of GDP).   Thus, the model is consistent 
with the data in predicting that Costa Rica, the country with less volatility in public 
revenues, should be the one that has a better chance of sustaining a high debt ratio.  This 
is the case even though Costa Rica’s growth rate is the same as Colombia’s and is lower 
than the growth rates in Mexico and Brazil by 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points respectively. 
The potential dangers of using the Blanchard ratios for conducting debt 
sustainability analysis are illustrated in the baseline results.  The case of Mexico is 
particularly striking.  The Blanchard ratio, which would compute a sustainable debt ratio 
using the difference between the average public revenue and the average government 
outlays, yields a debt ratio of about 132 percent, nearly 2.5 times larger than the NDL 
produced by the MO model.  In the case of Costa Rica, the Blanchard ratio also exceeds 
the NDL but by a very small margin.  In contrast, in the cases of the two countries where 
complying with the NDLs would require the largest expenditure cuts (i.e., where the 
consistency of the high debt ratio with fiscal solvency is more questionable), the 
Blanchard ratio yields public debt ratios so low that are of little practical relevance.  The 
Blanchard ratio for Brazil is 3.5 percent and for Colombia the ratio is negative, at –5.3   28
percent (because in the data the average outlays exceed the average revenues by 0.16 
percentage points of GDP).  In these cases the Blanchard ratio would be switched to its 
alternative interpretation, where a target debt ratio would be chosen and the Blanchard 
ratio would then be used to set an average primary fiscal balance that the governments 
should aim to obtain by adjusting fiscal policy. 
  Consider next the natural debt limits in the GS and HRIR scenarios.  If the growth 
slowdown of the last two decades persists, and even assuming that the coefficients of 
fiscal adjustment were to remain as high as estimated in the baseline scenario, the current 
debt ratios would exceed the natural debt limits of all four countries by large margins.  
The situation of Brazil would be particularly compromised, because the current debt ratio 
of 56 percent would exceed the maximum debt ratio consistent with a fully credible 
commitment to repay in the GS scenario by nearly 26 percentage points of GDP.  
The HRIR scenario, in which for example a retrenchment of world capital 
markets, increased long-run default risk, or the pressure of large fiscal deficits in 
industrial countries push the real interest rate on emerging markets public debt to 8 
percent, has even more damaging effects.  In this case, even if the growth rates recover to 
the 1961-2000 averages and even with the large fiscal adjustment coefficients set in the 
baseline scenario, the natural debt limits of all four countries fall to a range between 25.2 
percent for Brazil to 27.4 percent for Costa Rica.  Notice, however, that the prediction of 
the model is not that an increase of the interest rate to 8 percent would trigger immediate 
fiscal crises in all four countries.  For a fiscal crisis to occur immediately, the increase in 
the interest rate would have to be once-and-for-all and permanent.  A transitory hike in 
the real interest rate could be absorbed in an analogous manner as a transitory downturn   29
in public revenues, and hence a fiscal crisis would only be triggered after a sufficiently 
long sequence of adverse shocks.   
This last observation highlights again the fact that the NDL is not (in general) the 
same as the sustainable or equilibrium level of debt, which is determined by the dynamics 
driven by the government budget constraint.  We turn now to study these dynamics.   
Debt Dynamics 
The simulations of debt dynamics consider a grid of public debt-GDP ratios that 
spans the interval from 0 to the NDL (the model assumes that if the government budget 
constraint yields negative debt at any time, the corresponding fiscal surplus is instead 
rebated to the private sector as a lump-sum transfer).  The dynamics of sustainable debt 
can be traced from any initial public debt ratio in this interval.  However, one needs to be 
careful in studying the long-run dynamics of debt ratios because this basic version of the 
MO model features at least two long-run distributions of public debt, one converging to 0 
and the other to the NDL.  Which of these two distributions is attained in the long run 
depends on initial conditions. 
The prediction that the long-run debt ratio is not determined within the model 
(i.e., that the long-run debt ratio depends on initial conditions) is not a peculiarity unique 
to the MO model.  An outcome like this is the key prediction for debt dynamics of the 
classic tax-smoothing framework of Barro (1979), and it is also in line with the findings 
on Ramsey optimal taxation problems in which smooth taxes are optimal taxes (see 
Chapter 12 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)).   
The stochastic processes of public revenues used in the simulations are 
characterized by time-invariant Markov chains.  The Markov chains are defined by three   30
objects: an n-element vector of realizations of the revenues, t, an nxn transition 
probability matrix, P, and a probability distribution for the initial value of the realization 
of revenues, π0.  The typical element of P, Pij , indicates the probability of observing 
revenues t=tj in the next period given that revenues are t=ti in the current period. 
For each country, the vector of realizations of revenues has 5 elements (n=5).  The 
lowest value of t is set two standard deviations below average revenues in each of the 
four countries under analysis.  We use Tauchen’s (1986) univariate quadrature method in 
order to construct the rest of the elements of t and the matrix P so as to approximate the 
first-order autocorrelation and standard deviation of public revenues observed in the data. 
The stochastic simulations require also that we generate a T-period time series of 
realizations of revenues, i.e. t1, t2, ... tT, drawn from the Markov vector t.  This time series 
is constructed using realizations of a uniform random variable u in [0,1] that indicates 
how to pick one realization of tax revenue in period t+1 given the realization at time t. 
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    The first application of the stochastic simulations is illustrated in Figure 2, 
which shows the number of periods that it takes to hit a fiscal crisis (i.e., to hit the NDL) 
for the country-specific calibrated parameters and seven initial debt ratios that span the 
range between 0.25 and the maximum debt ratio observed in each country in the 1990-
2002 sample.  From each initial condition of the debt ratio, there are different stochastic 
paths that public debt, revenues and outlays can follow in the future, and each of these 
paths features a different number of periods to hit a fiscal crisis.  The tall bars in the   31
figure report the average time to a fiscal crisis from 1000 simulations of the public-debt 
dynamics induced by the government budget constraint in equation (4). The simulated tax 
revenues correspond to the realizations of revenues drawn from the Markov chains 
calibrated to the revenue processes of each country (see Table 1 for the corresponding 
averages and coefficients of variation).  Depending on initial conditions, there are 
simulation in which a fiscal crisis never occurs (particularly for low initial debt ratios).  
In these cases, the average measure of time to fiscal crisis would go to infinity, and hence 
is omitted from the charts. 
The short bars in the plots show the minimum possible number of periods before 
hitting the fiscal crisis. This extreme adverse scenario corresponds to simulations of debt 
dynamics under the assumption that, in every period, the government draws the lowest 
realization of the public revenue contained in the vector of realizations of revenues. 
The top two graphs in Figure 2 show that in Brazil and Colombia the mean time 
to a fiscal crisis is high (15 years or more) for an initial debt ratio equal to 0.25.  A fiscal 
crisis can occur much sooner on average (in less than 2.5 years) when then initial debt 
ratio is around 0.5.  The difference between the mean and extreme time to hit a fiscal 
crisis is larger in Brazil than in Colombia for all initial debt ratios.  Furthermore, the 
extreme scenario indicates a shorter time to a fiscal crisis in Brazil than in Colombia 
regardless of the initial debt ratio.  This is because the lowest realization of revenues are 
calibrated to be two standard deviations below the mean, so the higher volatility of 
revenues in Brazil implies that the crisis-level of revenues for Brazil is more distant from 
the mean than for Colombia.   32
The bottom two graphs in Figure 2 (for the cases of Costa Rica and Mexico) serve 
to illustrate how uncertainty affects the dynamics of public debt and the fact that the NDL 
is not in general the same as the equilibrium or sustainable debt.  The fact that these plots 
only show bars for the mean time to a fiscal crisis for high debt ratios (above 50 percent) 
indicates that in the sampling of 1000 stochastic simulations starting from debt ratios 
below 0.5, there were many cases in which the debt ratio converged to zero instead of 
reaching the NDL.  Consider for example the initial debt ratio of about 0.35 in the plot 
for Costa Rica.  The extreme measure of time to a fiscal crisis shows that a fiscal crisis 
will occur after 10 years of experiencing realizations of revenues two-standard-deviations 
below the mean.  However, in the 1000 stochastic simulations used to calculate the mean 
time to a fiscal crisis, only about half of the simulations reached the NDL and the rest 
converged to a zero public debt position in the long run.  Similarly, for an initial debt 
ratio of 0.4, the debt ratio never reached the NDL in 127 out of 1000 simulations. Thus, 
the Costa Rican and Mexican cases illustrate examples in which the sustainable debt 
dynamics deviate sharply from the NDL.  
    Figure 3 shows a sample of simulated time series of the public debt ratio and 
illustrates further how much the NDL and the sustainable debt ratios differ.  The figure 
shows 50 simulations of debt ratios all starting from a common initial ratio of 0.35, using 
the parameter values calibrated to Costa Rica.  At each date t, a random draw of public 
revenues, along with the date-t debt and the fiscal rules for public outlays, are used to 
determine the value of the debt at t+1.  Notice that, whereas for some paths the debt ratio 
increases rapidly to reach the NDL, for other paths it takes a long time to reach it and for 
other paths the debt goes to zero.  As explained above, for a large range of initial values   33
of public debt the model predicts that debt ratio will reach the debt limit while for other 
initial values the debt ratio goes to zero.  This implies that for starting values of the debt 
ratio above 0.35, the fraction of paths driving the debt to its maximum level increases and 
for starting values below 0.35 that fraction decreases. 
Default Risk 
  Up to this point we followed the methodology proposed by Mendoza and Oviedo 
(2004) in which sovereign default was set aside to focus on modeling the optimal debt 
policy consistent with fiscal solvency and an ad-hoc rule smoothing public outlays.  
Default risk was only taken into account in setting the value of the long-run real interest 
rate used to solve for the NDLs and the debt dynamics (5 percent in the benchmark case, 
8 percent in the high-interest-rate scenario).  However, time-varying default risk premia 
are an important feature of public debt in emerging markets.  It may make sense for a 
government to conduct a forward-looking debt sustainability exercise in which it assumes 
that default risk is time invariant as a benchmark scenario, but it is important to study 
how the results change when time-varying default risk is introduced. 
  One important limitation of the analysis of default risk is that existing theoretical 
models of default on optimal sovereign debt contracts face serious challenges in 
explaining observed debt ratios.  The canonical model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
considers a risk-neutral lender and a risk-averse borrower that has the option of 
defaulting at the cost of facing permanent exclusion of the debt market.  The lender is 
willing to take on the risk of default by charging a rate of interest that incorporates a 
premium consistent with the probability of repayment (as implied by a standard arbitrage 
condition between the expected repayment on defaultable debt and the return on risk-free   34
bonds).  There are well-known theoretical problems with this setup, related to the classic 
Bulow-Rogoff critique showing that the threat of exclusion may not be credible because 
of the option to enter in deposit contracts with lenders, but even if the model were not 
affected by these problems, recent quantitative studies show that models in the Eaton-
Gersovitz tradition support very small debt ratios of less than 10 percent of GDP (see 
Arellano (2004)).  This is because the models yield probabilities of default that increase 
too rapidly at very low levels of debt. 
  Given the above difficulties with the theory of endogenous default risk, we follow 
a pragmatic approach that takes into account the same risk-neutral lender of the Eaton-
Gersovitz model but incorporates an exogenous probability of repayment calibrated to 
match observed default risk premia in emerging markets.  The arbitrage condition of the 
risk-neutral lender implies: 
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In this expression, R
w is the gross world risk-free real interest rate and λ (bt) is the 
probability of repayment (i.e., 1-λ (bt) is the probability of default).  The repayment 
probability is modeled as an exponential probability distribution exp(-abt), where the 
curvature parameter a determines the speed at which the repayment probability falls as 
debt increases.   
The exponential formulation of default risk has the advantage that it is consistent 
with two key properties of the endogenous default probability of the Eaton-Gersovitz line 
of models: (a) the probability of default is increasing and convex on the level of debt and 
(b) the probability of default is zero if the stock of debt is zero.  The formulation fails to   35
reproduce the property of the Eaton-Gersovitz setup that the probability of default 
approaches 1 for a finite “rationing” level of debt at which debtors always find it 
preferable to default than to repay (the exponential probability of default approaches 1 
asymptotically as debt goes to infinity).  However, the formulation still allows for values 
of a that yield very large risk premia for high levels of debt comparable to those observed 
in the data. 
We calibrate the value of a so that the arbitrage condition in (7) holds taking as 
given the EMBI+ country risk premium and the public debt ratio observed in Mexico in 
1998 (the year of Mexico’s maximum debt ratio in the 1990-2002 sample).  Mexico’s 
debt ratio in 1998 was bt = 0.549 and the real interest rate that the country faced on this 
debt, measured as the U.S. 90-day T-bill rate plus the EMBI+ spread, was R(bt) = 10.48 
percent.  The risk-free rate (i.e., the real U.S. 90-day T-bill rate) was R
w =3.2 percent.   
Plugging these figures into (7) and solving for a yields a = 0.124.  Interestingly, the 
observed maximum debt and the real interest rate with default premium for Brazil in the 
year 2002 are very similar to Mexico’s 1998 figures (Brazil’s debt ratio was 0.56 and the 
real interest rate with default risk was 10.8 percent).  This suggests that using a common 
value of a for the four countries under study is not a bad first approximation. 
As we show below, default risk has two important implications for the analysis of 
sustainable debt based on the MO model.  First, it lowers the levels of NDLs, since the 
real interest rates considered in Table 1 are lower than those resulting in the worst state of 
nature with default risk.  Second, it alters the dynamics of public debt, since the rate of 
interest now increases with the level of debt.   These two effects result in lower NDLs, 
reduced levels of sustainable debt and faster convergence to states of fiscal crisis.     36
Table 2 shows the effects of introducing time-varying default risk in the 
calculations of NDLs.
3  In all the estimates shown in this Table, the risk free rate is set at 
the 1990-2002 average of the real 90-day T-bill rate, which is 2.36 percent, and the 
curvature parameter of the probability of repayments is kept at a = 0.124.  
The first panel of Table 2 shows how the benchmark estimates of NDLs change 
when default risk is introduced.  These benchmark estimates take the same growth rates 
and minimum levels of public revenues and outlays as in the benchmark scenario of 
Table 1.  The resulting NDLs are significantly smaller (by 17 to 26 percentage points of 
GDP) than those in the benchmark case without default risk.  Note that this sharp decline 
of the NDLs occurs despite the fact that the risk-free rate at 2.36 percent is about half the 
long-run real interest rate used in the benchmark scenario of Table 1.  The repayment 
probabilities at 96 percent and the default risk premia around 4.35 percent are similar 
across countries.  The NDLs in this case ensure that governments would be able to repay 
even during a fiscal crisis, but they still may choose to default on debt ratios about 0.33 
with 4 percent probability. 
The second panel of Table 2 shows how NDLs change in the growth slowdown 
scenario (which is perhaps more relevant since the data used to calibrate the risk free rate 
and the repayment probability function are for the 19901-2002 period).   Again, relative 
to the growth slowdown scenario of Table 1, we are lowering the risk-free rate from 5 to 
2.36 percent and introducing time-varying default risk.  To isolate the contribution of the 
latter, the third panel of Table 2 shows the NDLs obtained using the growth rates of the 
                                                 
3 Note that with default risk, the constant rate of interest in the denominator of the formula for the NDL is 
replaced with the interest rate including default risk defined in equation (7).  Since this interest rate depends 
on the level of debt, the NDL is now the solution to a non-linear equation.   37
growth slowdown scenario but assuming that there is no default risk so that countries can 
borrow at the 2.36 percent risk free rate.  Since this rate is about half the one used in 
Table 1, we obtain very high NDLs (ranging from 73 to 152 percent of GDP).   
Two comparisons are interesting to make using the second and third panels of 
Table 2.  First, the fact that the NDLs of the growth slowdown scenario in Table 1 
(ranging from 30 to 45 percent of GDP) are much smaller than those of the no-default-
risk case in panel 3 of Table 2, shows that our strategy of setting a long-run real interest 
rate of 5 percent as a proxy for default risk in the estimates of Table 1 was not a bad 
approximation.  Second, the calculations of NDLs of the second and third panel differ 
only because the second incorporates the time-varying default risk premium (i.e., both 
have the same risk-free rate of 2.36 percent).  Since the NDLs without time-varying 
default risk are 3 to 5 times larger than those with default risk, this comparison shows 
that default risk has major implications for estimates of NDLs. 
The last panel of Table 2 re-computes the required adjustments in outlays (i.e. the 
values of g
min) needed to support the observed maximum debt ratios of each country in 
the 1990-2002 sample as NDLs taking into account time-varying default risk.  The 
adjustments in outlays are significantly larger than those reported in Table 1.  Measured 
in standard deviations, the required adjustment in outlays exceeds the two-standard 
deviation threshold for all countries and it is larger for Mexico than for the other 
countries.  Measured in terms of percentage points of GDP, the adjustments rank from 
9.4 and 6 percentage points for Brazil and Colombia respectively to about 7 percentage 
points for Costa Rica and Mexico.  This ranking suggests again that the debt positions of   38
Brazil and Colombia are more difficult to reconcile with fiscal solvency considerations 
than those of Costa Rica and Mexico. 
Figure 4 illustrates the implications of default risk for the dynamics of public debt 
reflected in the measures of time to hit a fiscal crisis.  The average time to hit a fiscal 
crisis is generally lower once the fact that the default risk premium rises with the level of 
debt is considered.  Moreover, default risk produces debt dynamics that hit NDLs more 
often.  This can be seen in the plots for Costa Rica and Mexico.  In Costa Rica’s plot, for 
example, an initial debt ratio of 40 percent produced at least some stochastic simulations 
in the sampling of 1000 runs in which the debt vanished when we use a fixed interest 
rate.  With default risk, however, all 1000 stochastic simulations eventually hit the NDL 
and on average it takes about 9 years for the economy to hit a fiscal crisis. 
5.    Conclusions, Caveats & Extensions 
This application of the basic version of the MO model to the cases of Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico shows that, with the exception of Costa Rica, public 
debt ratios are already close to the natural debt limits that the governments of these 
countries should respect if they wish to preserve smooth access to debt markets, and 
protect the credibility of their perceived commitment to be able to repay their debts.  This 
is the result assuming a relatively optimistic scenario in which the growth slowdown of 
the last two decades is reversed to recover the average per-capita growth rates observed 
between 1961 and 2000, and the real interest rate remains at a relatively low level of 5 
percent.  This baseline scenario is also optimistic in that it requires credible commitments 
to large cuts in government outlays which recent experience indicates are a low-
probability event (in terms of a coefficient of adjustment defined in units of standard   39
deviations relative to the mean of the ratio of outlays to GDP).  Considering less 
optimistic scenarios in which growth continues at the low trend of the last two decades or 
the real interest rate increases to 8 percent, current debt ratios would exceed NDLs even 
with the same tough stance to cut outlays in a state of fiscal crisis assumed in the 
benchmark scenario. 
The model predicts that the long-run dynamics of the public debt ratio are 
undetermined (or more precisely that there is no unique, invariant limiting distribution for 
the debt output ratio).  This result needs to be considered carefully.  On one hand, the 
result does not require very strong assumptions: stochastic revenue, relatively inflexible 
outlays and some limit to debt market access (whether an NDL or some an ad-hoc debt 
limit).  Also, the same outcome would result if we take outlays as given and consider 
instead arguments for tax smoothing as in Barro (1979).  If these are the maintained 
assumptions of fiscal solvency analysis, the estimates of time to a fiscal crisis and the 
stochastic simulations of debt ratios shown in Figures 2-4, together with the natural debt 
limits, summarize all relevant information for assessing whether observed public debt 
dynamics are sustainable.  In addition, we would need to worry about how this non-
stationarity property affects other statistical methods of debt sustainability analysis that 
rely on the existence of a well-defined long-run distribution of debt. 
On the other hand, we may question the validity of the assumptions that led to the 
result of an indeterminate long-run distribution of debt.  In Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) 
we propose a setup in which government chooses its outlays optimally instead of setting 
ad-hoc rules.  In particular, we assume that government outlays yield utility to the private 
sector, with the added feature of a Stone-Geary-like utility function that sets minimum   40
levels of government expenditures.  We preserve the spirit of the “tormented insurer’s” 
problem by keeping the assumption that the government aims to maximize its 
contribution to private utility given the randomness of fiscal revenue and the fact that it 
can only issue non-state-contingent debt.  In this setup, the government has a 
precautionary-savings motive that yields a unique, invariant limiting distribution of 
public debt (resulting from the trade off between the need to self-insure against the risk of 
persistent revenue shocks and the desire to smooth government outlays).  The role of the 
NDL is made clearer because the desire to respect it emerges from the fact that otherwise 
the government is exposed to the risk of experiencing states in which its outlays can be 
very low, and the government is very averse to these states because of the constant-
relative-risk-aversion nature of the utility function of public expenditures. 
Most of the analysis was conducted giving a limited role to default risk (by simply 
setting a long-run, time-invariant real interest rate with a premium above the risk-free 
rate).  This was done following the approach of the MO model to provide a forward-
looking tool to design fiscal programs with the explicit intention of preserving the 
government’s ability to fulfill its financial obligations.  However, default risk is an 
important feature of emerging markets of sovereign debt, and hence it is worth adding it 
to the analysis of debt sustainability.   
We introduced default risk by adopting an exogenous, exponential probability of 
repayment that varies with the level of debt.  We assumed that lenders are risk neutral 
and hence are willing to take default risk by lending at a rate that incorporates the 
premium that equates the expected return of risky lending with the risk-free interest rate.   
The risk premium function was calibrated to match observed debt ratios and EMBI+   41
spreads on sovereign debt.   Introducing this change into the basic version of the M-O 
model produces smaller debt limits and speeds up the dynamics that lead to states of 
fiscal crisis in which NDLs are reached.  NDLs that completely ignore default risk 
support dynamic paths of sustainable debt with much higher debt ratios than those 
obtained when default risk is introduced.  However, since the basic M-O model 
approximated the long-run component of default risk by adding a constant premium 
above the risk-free interest rate, it yields results for debt dynamics that are a much closer 
approximation to those produced by the model with time-varying default risk than those 
of a model that ignores default risk completely.  
The application of the MO model undertaken in this paper did not consider two 
other important elements of the dynamics of public debt in emerging economies: the 
endogeneity of the tax bases and fiscal policy choices and the role of financial frictions 
like liability dollarization.  The endogeneity of the tax bases can be incorporated into the 
structure of the MO model.  This requires introducing the decisions of the private sector 
with regard to the variables that determine the allocations and prices that conform tax 
bases (such as labor supply, consumption, the current account and capital accumulation).  
Similarly, liability dollarization can be introduced by modifying the model to incorporate 
tradable and nontradable goods.  The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
studied in Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) tries to make progress in these two directions.   42
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                       Table 1.   Fiscal Sector Statistics and Natural Debt Limits
                                                         (in percent of GDP)
Brazil 1/ Colombia 2/ Costa Rica 2/ Mexico 3/
Fiscal sector statistics
Public debt 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002
average 40.68 33.71 49.46 45.92
maximum 56.00 50.20 53.08 54.90
year of maximum 2002 2002 1996 1998
Public revenue 1990-2002 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-2002
average 19.28 12.64 20.28 22.96
coeff. of variation 14.13 8.86 5.41 8.04
two-standard dev. Floor 13.83 10.40 18.09 19.27
Non-interest outlays 1991-1998 1990-1999 1990-2000 1990-2002
average 19.19 12.80 18.54 19.27
coeff. of variation 13.76 13.55 9.98 3.96
Implied fiscal adjustment 4/ 2.55 2.30 1.16 2.02
Implied minimum non-interest outlays 12.46 8.81 16.40 17.73
Benchmark Natural Debt Limits
(1961-2000 growth rates, 5 percent real interest rate)
Growth rate 2.55 1.86 1.83 2.20
Natural debt limit 56.09 50.49 53.31 54.92
Blanchard ratio 3.52 -5.29 54.80 131.54
Growth Slowdown Scenario
(1981-2000 growth rates, 5 percent real interest rate, benchmark fiscal adjustment)
Growth rate 0.48 1.05 1.25 0.83
Natural debt limit 30.34 40.10 45.10 36.96
Blanchard ratio 1.90 -4.20 46.36 88.52
High Real Interest Rate Scenario
(1961-2000 growth rates, 8 percent real interest rate, benchmark fiscal adjustment)
Growth rate 2.55 1.86 1.83 2.20
Natural debt limit 25.19 25.81 27.39 26.53
Blanchard ratio 1.58 -2.70 28.16 63.55
Note:  The source of public debt data is IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2003.  The sources 
of revenue and non-interest outlays are as noted in country footnotes.
1/  Revenue data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, Oct. 2003., non-interest outlays data derived
from data for the Central Government in World Development Indicators.
2/ Revenue and non-interest outlays data for Central Government from World Dev. Indicators.
3/ Revenue and non-interest outlays data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, October, 2003.
4/ Implied fiscal adjustment is the number of standard deviations relative to the mean needed to
obtain a benchmark natural debt limit equal to the largest public debt ratio observed in the data.  45
Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Mexico
Benchmark NDLs with default risk 1/
Natural debt limit 33.28 33.18 34.14 33.88
Probability of repayment 95.96 95.97 95.86 95.89
Default risk premium 4.31 4.30 4.42 4.39
NDLs in the growth slowdown scenario with default risk 
Natural debt limit 26.12 30.38 32.12 29.12
Probability of repayment 96.82 96.31 96.10 96.46
Default risk premium 3.37 3.93 4.16 3.76
NDLs in the growth slowdown scenario without default risk and risk free rate of 2.36 percent
Natural debt limit 72.95 121.60 152.30 100.80
Required fiscal adjustment to support observed maximum debt ratios as NDLS 2/
Natural debt limit 56.00 50.20 53.08 54.90
Probability of repayment 93.30 93.97 93.64 93.43
Default risk premium 7.35 6.57 6.95 7.20
Implied minimum non-interest outlays 9.82 6.85 14.12 15.23
    relative to average outlays -9.37 -5.95 -4.42 -4.04
    in number of st. devs. 3.55 3.43 2.39 5.30
Notes:  Calculations done as described in the text, using a risk free rate of 2.36 percent, which is the 1990-2002 
average of the inflation-adjusted 90-day U.S. T-bill rate, and a curvature parameter for the risk function of 
a=0.124, which was calibrated to match the EMBI+ spread and the debt ratios observed in Mexico in 1998. 
1/ Based on the benchmark values of growth rates and minimum revenue and outlays shown in Table 1
2/ Values of minimum outlays required to support maximum debt ratios shown in Table 1 as NDLs in the setting 
with default risk, using growth rates from the benchmark scenario.
                                       Table 2.   Natural Debt Limits with Default Risk  46
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